The question of whether a non-human author can own a copyright has been the subject of much discussion, including Copyright Office opinions and circulars (see my previous post on a recent Office report on AI and copyright).
The most famous case – one that captured the public imagination – is the case of the monkey selfie, in which a photographer applied for copyright registration for a photo taken by a crested macaque using a camera the photographer had set up in the forests of Indonesia.

The U.S. Copyright Office ruled that only works created by a human being can be copyrighted; the Office “will not register works produced by nature, animals, or plants.” Notably, the list does not include software or machines.
Though the human creation requirement didn’t seem promising for authors working with artificial intelligence, it seemed like maybe the door was open just a crack.
Now that door has definitively closed. In a recent decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a non-human machine cannot be an author under the Copyright Act.
The lawsuit, Thaler v. Perlmutter, was brought by Dr. Stephen Thaler, a computer scientist who created artwork using AI. He filed a copyright application for the work (below, called “A Recent Entrance to Paradise”), listing the “Author” as the “Creativity Machine” and himself as the “Copyright Claimant,” i.e., the owner of the work.

After the Copyright Office denied Dr. Thaler’s application on the ground that “a human being did not create the work,” he went through the Office appeal process, then to federal district court, and up to the Court of Appeals.
In a thorough opinion, the appeals court affirmed that the Copyright Office appropriately denied Dr. Thaler’s application because “the Copyright Act requires all work to be authored in the first instance by a human being.”
The heart of the opinion is the court’s analysis of the Copyright Act’s language relating to “authors” and “machines.” The court runs through a series of statutory provisions that:
both identify authors as human beings and define “machines” as tools used by humans in the creative process rather than as creators themselves. Because many of the Copyright Act’s provisions make sense only if an author is a human being, the best reading of the Copyright Act is that human authorship is required for registration.
First, the court notes that the Copyright Act’s ownership provision is premised on the author’s legal capacity to own property, and a machine cannot own property, so it cannot be an author under the statute.
Second, the Copyright Act ties the term of copyright protection to the author’s lifespan, expiring 70 years after the author’s death. Machines do not have “lives” and their operability period is not measured like a human life, so they cannot be authors under the statute.
Third, the inheritance provision of the statute provides for passage of copyright to a surviving spouse or children, and machines, of course, do not have spouses or other heirs.
Fourth, a copyright transfer requires a signature, and machines lack signatures and the legal capacity to provide authenticating signatures. Fifth, authors of unpublished works are protected regardless of “nationality or domicile,” and machines do not have domiciles or nationalities. Sixth, for a joint work, the authors must have the intention to collaborate, while machines do not have intentions.
Finally, the court noted that every time the Copyright Act discusses machines, the context indicates that machines are not authors, but are merely tools to assist authors. For instance, a “computer program” is defined as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly” to “bring about a certain result.” The statute defines the term “machine” the same as “device” and “process,” i.e., as mechanisms that assist authors, rather than authors themselves.
The court summed up:
All of these statutory provisions collectively identify an “author as a human being. Machines do not have property, traditional human lifespans, family members, domiciles, nationalities, mentes reae, or signatures. By contrast, reading the Copyright Act to require human authorship comports with the statute’s text, structure, and design because humans have all the attributes the Copyright Act treats authors as possessing.
Therefore, where copyright is concerned, only humans need apply: “the current Copyright Act’s text, taken as a whole, is best read as making humanity a necessary condition for authorship under the Copyright Act.
Amid this flurry of legal activity around humans, non-humans, and copyright, the framework laid out in my maiden post – adding some human creativity to an AI-generated work – remains the only viable path to copyright protection for artists using AI.